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1. Political Legitimation and Ideology
The relationship between religion, politics and the nation-state is in this paper closely linked to the 
principles that create political legitimation and the basic character of a state. The analysis of this 
entanglement seems to be necessary, especially due to the popular belief that in the light of the de-
colonization process Pakistan and Israel, after 1947 and 1948, represent the sole states that after a 
legacy of British rule came into existence on the basis of religion or rather, only because of their re-
ligion.2 This paper is to identify the main principles of legitimation understood as the state's ideo-
logy on which these states were originally based but at the same time generated intrinsic tensions 
for their future development. Further, the framework that allows religion to play an essential role 
not only in the state's ideological setup but also in society and politics will be defined. Two main 
factors might illustrate these tensions. Firstly, the concepts of statehood of the movement that pro-
moted the creation of the state defined its legitimacy as the dominant agency from the pre-state peri-
od to the state formation until the establishment of power structures in which it implemented its  
agenda. Mullahs and rabbis as “potential rulemakers”3 were accommodated by the cultural mechan-
ism of consensus regarding the essence of state legitimacy as a state that had been founded on the 
basis of universalistic principles, providing different legal frameworks and institutions of law that – 
in terms of democratic freedom and equality - apply to all citizens. Simultaneously, particularistic 
national-religious elements represent a historical and doctrinal continuity with traditions of Judaism 
and Islam. The basic duality of particularism and universalism inherent in Judaism and Islam has 
been reproduced in the making of the states and is incorporated into the foundations of statehood. 
1 Data used in this paper is in parts drawn from interviews conducted during fieldwork, supported by Konrad Ade-
nauer Foundation, in Pakistan and India (June 2008 and June to August 2009) and Israel/ Palestinian Territories  
(December 2009 to January 2010) with representatives of political and religious parties, non-parliamentary wings,  
civil bureaucracy, governmental think tanks, faith-based organizations/ NGOs, military, media and diplomats, schol-
ars and intellectuals. 
2 Apart from this vague image of confessional artificial 'twin-states', with the exception of one article there has been 
no systematic comparative analysis until now. See Kumaraswamy, P. R.: The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and 
Pakistan. In: The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, Nr. 2, 1997.
3 See Migdal, Joel S.: The Crystallization of the State and the Struggles Over Rulemaking: Israel in Comparative Per -
spective. In: Kimmerling, Baruch (Ed.): The Israeli State and Society. Boundaries and Frontiers. Albany: State Univ. 
of New York Press, 1989, pp. 1-27.
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Politically, the mechanism of power sharing aimed at integrate the religious sector to a limited de-
gree into the political culture in order to maintain social  control. Secondly, this specific political, 
cultural and ideological framework and the impact of nationalism respectively its ability to subvert 
and integrate religion in its ideological setting had been conceived more in secular, rather than reli-
gious terms by their leaders who were supposed to be personally irreligious. Nonetheless, the reli-
gious repertoire as part of the civic culture4 has been mobilized by the governmental sector and reli-
gious groups for different reasons. A state that came into being on the basis of religious nationalism 
raises a series of complex questions regarding the definition of 'citizenship' and its specific boundar-
ies and requirements for substantive participation: 'Who is a Muslim?' and 'who is a Jew?' and be-
cause of this a legally full-privileged citizen of the state, that grants considerable privileges to spe-
cific segments of its Muslim or Jewish majority population. Issues touching the most intimate and 
individual level of citizenship – marriage, divorce, prayers in public spaces etc. - often arise from 
disputes between different religious schools of thought. These theologic and intellectual discourses 
mark significant sectarian lines between religious groups. Because of the lack of a central religious 
authority and a codified religious legal corpus, that is accepted by all religious groups and sects, a 
vacuum of interpretation provides ground for various doctrines. 
2. State and Religious Sector
In order to reflect the second dimension, the following will discuss the main determinants of reli-
gion in the state and what role religious parties play in this discourse. Until the states of Pakistan 
and Israel had been proclaimed independent on 14 August 1947 and 14 May 1948, the political pro-
cesses that lead to these events, had been the arena in which various groups tried to implement their 
conceptualizations for the new states competing against each other. Facing the realities of the new 
established states, the religious parties had to re-think their position towards the new political elite.
2.1 Pakistan
In Pakistan, the process of constitution making lasted until 1973. Until that time, the majority of the  
4 The character of a state's civic culture refers to several factors such as class, gender, race, caste, region, ethnicity, re-
ligion etc. that can represent politically salient concepts for shared identities or can be the markers generating the 
basis for separation and conflict. Similarly, 'political culture' can be characterized as a process of transforming ideas, 
institutions and values between state and society into modernity and is accompanied by 'cultural secularization'. 
Though the concept of 'civic culture' shares the assumption that a political culture is participative and pre-domin-
antly secular, it is inseparably intertwined with 'non-secular positions and belief systems' and seems therefore more  
adequate in this study. Cit. Seitz, Werner: Die politische Kultur und ihre Beziehung zum Abstimmungsverhalten.  
Eine Begriffsgeschichte und Methodenkritik. Zürich: Realotopia, 1997, p. 93. Regarding the political and social sta-
bility of state-society relations, civic culture represents the ideal type of congruency between modernity and tradi -
tion to maximize stability and state integrity. See Gabriel Almond / Verba, Sidney (Eds.): The Civic Culture. Atti -
tudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury Park: Sage Publ., (1963) 1989, pp. 13/14. 
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religious scholars (‘ulamâ’ ) had supported the nationalist movement of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, that 
promoted the new state of Pakistan. The stumbling block in the discourse on how Pakistan came 
into existence is the two-fold legacy that was based, firstly, on the belief that the preservation and 
development of Muslim culture and economy would not be achieved in a Hindu-dominated post-co-
lonial India (Two-Nations-Theory) and, secondly, on a semi-religious philosophy that, pioneered by 
Muhammad Iqbal and Jinnah, offered the ground for what Aziz calls 'a national belief'5. Though re-
ligiously inspired or at least mobilizing Islamic symbols, ideas and slogans – searching for historic-
al continuity of the Muslims on the sub-continent, neither the advocates of the Pakistan Movement 
nor their opponents offered an inclusive concept of Islam in the state: 'Who is to determine a na-
tion`s Islamic path- the head of state, bureaucrats, the `ulema, intellectuals?'6 
What crystallized out as a master narrative suggests that the right of self-determination as a funda-
mental right of all human beings was the basic idea behind the paradigm of two primordial nations, 
each searching for its own path of self-determination. Hence,  partition as a consequence of the 
concept of Two-Nations was an imperative for the Muslim leadership to exercise this right and „to 
help the two nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, to live in peace and harmony.“7 According to this 
argumentation, the Hindu majority in the Indian National Congress refused to collaborate with the 
leadership of  Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Pakistan Movement/ Freedom Movement) who gained constitu-
tional guaranties for the Muslim minority in a united India. The decision for partition and the cre-
ation of Pakistan was therefore an act of 'self-defense' against the various attempts to create a Hindu 
hegemony in India.8 
History writing on the sub-continent and numerous works of Western scholars that have evolved 
around the events of partition and independence have cultivated a biased academic discourse:
Historiography on Pakistan, inclusive of themes such as the debate on Muslim identity,  the  
struggle for independence, the relationship between the centre and the provinces, the uneven in-
5 See Aziz, K. K.: The Pakistani Historian. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2009, p. 71.
6 Cit. Esposito, John L.: Foreword. In: Weiss, Anita M. (Ed.): Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan. The Application of Is -
lamic Laws in a Modern State. Lahore: Vanguard, 1987.
7 Cit.  Sadiq,  Khwaja Ghulam: Speech. In:  The Philosophical  Basis of  the Ideology of Pakistan (A Symposium).  
Lahore, 1969, p. 10.
8 See Sadiq, 1969, pp. 11-13.
In numerous works the origins of the Pakistani nation and the genesis of the Two-Nations-Theory are traced back 
two the advent of Islam in the sub-continent. Representatives of the 'Pakistan School' do thereby refer to differing  
and diffuse 'historical turns' in South Asia that marked the beginning of Muslim rule. See Ali, Chaudhry Rahmat: 
Pakistan:  The Fatherland of  the Pakistan Nation. Lahore:  Book Traders,  1978;  al-Mujahid,  Sharif:  Ideology of 
Pakistan. Islamabad: IRI, 2001; Aziz, K. K.: The Making of Pakistan. London: Chatto and Windus, National Book 
Foundation, 1967. Aziz, former Head of the National Commission of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 
became with his subsequent works a critic of the historiographic discourse in Pakistan. 
3
terface between state and civil society or the country`s external relationships, especially with In-
dia, has tended to be Islamic-centric. Pakistani and other observers, in their own separate ways,  
have tried to disentangle the problematic of Islam both in the achievement and the subsequent 
nation-building project.9
The fundamental question, whether the Father of the Nation, himself a Western-educated Shia, in-
tended to design Pakistan as a secular state or as a state with a dominant role of religion, can not 
satisfactorily be answered since his intellectual legacy, mainly his speeches, leaves much room for 
interpretation. Therefore, the political and private life of Mohammad Ali Jinnah has become a mat-
ter of considerable debate that had been initiated by Bolitho's  Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan, pub-
lished and sponsored by the Government of Pakistan in 1950 and culminated recently when in 2009 
the expulsion of the Indian BJP politician Jaswant Singh from the party followed his Jinnah: India- 
Partition. Independence, in which he lauded Jinnah as a 'good Indian' in contrast to the pro-partition 
stance of Jawaharlal Nehru.10
Among different theories focusing more on the political process that resulted in the creation of 
Pakistan, Hamza Alavi's salariat theory should be taken into account, claiming that the Pakistan 
Movement was not a purely religious movement, but represented a consensus of diverse Muslim 
ethnic groups, more in pursuit of explicit material goals, which Jinnah had to compromise. To in-
clude these “diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions of India, representing different so-
cial strata and interests"11 was a political demand to gain a stable basis of support. This backbone of 
'Muslim nationalism' was mainly constituted by those strata of Indian colonial society, that as urban 
professionals were supposed to be integrated in the colonial state apparatus. Before they joined Jin-
nah, they had experienced Indian nationalist ideas and claimed more representative self-govern-
ment. Based on regional ethnic identities, especially the Punjab, Bengal and Uttar Pradesh salariat 
supported the Movement under the banner of a Muslim identity which lost its legitimacy as soon as  
the state was founded. Most dominantly involved was the salariat of Punjab which is until now 
overrepresented in military and civil-bureaucracy in contrast to the Bengali salariats that were un-
der-represented when the state was established.12 The dynamic of Muslim nationalism as an integ-
9 Cit. Malik, Iftikhar H.: Islam, Nationalism and the West. Issues of Identity in Pakistan. Basingstoke (u.a.): Macmil-
lan (u.a.), 1999, p. 98.
10 See The Times of India: BJP expels Jaswant Singh over Jinnah remarks, 19 September, 2009. 
For the impact of this discourse on textbooks and curricula in Pakistan and India see Aziz, K. K.: The Murder of 
History in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1993; Rosser, Yvette C.: Islamisation of Pakistani Social Studies Text-
books. New Delhi: Rupa, 2003.
11 Cit. Alavi, Hamza: Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology, p. 22. In: Weiss, Anita M. (Ed.): Islamic  
Reassertion in Pakistan. The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State. Lahore: Vanguard, 1987, pp. 21-47.
12 Ibid., pp. 24-27.
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rating force that, with the support of the salariat, eventually ensured the political survival of a small 
elitist group as against other groups (e.g. Unionist Party), lost its mobilizing power and an Islamic 
Ideology was promoted as the amalgam between a Weltanschauung of a primordial Muslim nation 
and its religious traditions:
The state […] should create such conditions as are most conducive to translating the idea-sys-
tem – that is, their cherished ideals – into social action. It should help in building a 'good soci -
ety', like the Greeks – except that this society has to be based upon the Islamic value-system, the  
system which Pakistanis fervidly believe in. The state should thus help its people in leading the 
Islamic way of life.13 
This diffuse concept of Islamic or Pakistan Ideology (Nazariya-e-Pakistan) is until today part of a 
legal and political debate that frequently arises on the basis of the Constitution of 197314, where the 
notion of Pakistan Ideology in reference to Art. 2 (Islam as state religion) and Art. 227 (Quran and 
Sunnah) tends to be interpreted as an affirmation of the state's pure Islamic character by some reli -
gious-political parties whereas, more on an individual basis, other parliamentarians claim to define 
the concrete character of this ideology in terms of its democratic, modernist and secular character.15 
As far as the representatives of religious groups and their stance to the movement are concerned, 
one has to differentiate between the groups and their inner disputes whether to join or to refuse Jin-
nah's party: “Practically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that was 
specifically religious – Islamic – was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly op-
posed the Pakistan movement”16, is an arguable statement but is still of relevance when taking into 
consideration that when the state of Pakistan became reality – like almost all political parties – reli -
gious parties had to accept its civic culture. In order to uphold the legitimacy which was needed to  
participate in the political process, the commitment to the “ideas and ideals of Quaid-e-Azam”, who 
died in 1948, was obligatory.17 This created a serious dilemma for those factions who had opposed 
Jinnah during the pre-state era: Basically Jama'at-e Islami, whose amir and founder, Mawlana Maw-
dudi, had not hidden his hostile attitude towards the idea of a territorial nationalism in contrast to 
the transnational concept of the  ummah, made several attempts to revise its past.18 Since the re-
13 Cit. al-Mujahid, Sharif: Ideology of Pakistan. Islamabad: IRI, 2001, pp. 15/16.
14 See Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (modif. 31 July, 2004), National Assembly of Pakistan, Art.  
63G – 62H. 
15 See for instance Daily Times: Bill seeking debate on ideology of Pakistan rejected, 13 September, 2006.
16 Cit. Ibid, p. 21.
17 Cit. Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League. Islamabad: Central Secretariat, 1996, Preamble; See also Pakistan 
Peoples Party Manifesto: Towards Peace and Prosperity in Pakistan, 2008.
18 See Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza: The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution. The Jama`at-i Islami of Pakistan. Berkeley:  
Univ. of California Press, 1994.
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sponse of the Muslim masses to the programme of the movement was very poor – in the elections of 
1936/37, All India Muslim League was defeated disastrously - the leadership tried to win the sup-
port of the religious groups of the different schools of thought and involved the ‘ulamâ’, masha’ikh 
and pirs for their potential of mobilizing members of the traditional religious institutions. The reli-
gious scholars purposed the legal implementation of Islam in the new independent state. On their 
first political platform, the All India Sunni Conference (1925), Brelwi ‘ulama’ voted for the support 
of Jinnah's platform, campaigned for the League and issued fatawa in favour of the League candid-
ates.19 In contrast to this, the official political body of the Deobandis, Jam‘iyyat al ‘Ulama’-e Hind 
(JUH), joined the Congress in 1940 and supported the idea of a 'Composite Nationalism' (Mut-
tahida Qawmiyyat), that promoted a collective position of Hindus, Muslims and minorities towards 
the British, gaining a united India. This was a reaction to the League's Lahore Resolution (1940) 
that demanded a constitutional rearrangement, arguing Indian Muslims to be considered as a nation 
rather than a minority.20    
After  independence,  nevertheless,  the  question  of  the  role  of  religion  in  Pakistan  was  not  yet 
answered  during  the  constitution-making  years  between  1947-1956.  The  Constituent  Assembly 
drafted the Objective Resolution in 1949, where democratic principles should be followed accord-
ing to Islamic values and principles. A 22-points Islamic program, agreed on by 31 ‘ulamâ’  of dif-
ferent factions was presented to the political leadership but it remained unclear how to legally integ-
rate these points into a modern constitution. In 1956, Field Marshall Ayub Khan passed a constitu-
tion of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Only six years later the power of the religious opposition 
became obvious, when Ayub withdrew the title 'Islamic' in order to design a secular image of the 
country in the light of the Cold War, where both ideological blocs tried to win allies in the Third 
World. Not only had Ayub to reinstate the Islam label in 1963, moreover, the religious parties mo-
bilized country-wide protest against his regime activating again the 'religious card' under the slogan 
“Stop innovation!”21. 
But it was during the presidency of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when in 1973 the 'Islamic' Constitution was 
19 For the political involvement of the Brelwis see Ahmad, Mujeeb: Jam`iyyat `Ulama-i-Pakistan 1948-1979. In: His-
torical Studies (Pakistan) Series, Vol. 12. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research NIHCR,  
1993, Introduction; see also Sanyal, Usha: Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi 
and His Movement, 1870-1920. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996.
20 'Muslim nationalism' was supported by a small faction of ‘ulama’  who had split off from JUH. See Pirzada, Sayyid 
A. S.: The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000, p. 2ff.
21 The protests were the response to the attempts of Ayub to modernize and secularize the academic institutions and to 
introduce an Islamic system of birth control (Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO), 15 July, 1961). See Jaffrelot, 
Christophe (Ed.): Le Pakistan. Paris: Fayard, 2000, p. 127.
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passed, trying to appease the religious sector by a specific framework whereby all laws had to be in 
conformity with the injunctions of Islam. The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was the advisory 
body that suggests until today recommendations on religious matters to the political leadership. It 
was at that time when Bhutto responded to the pressure of the religious parties and declared the 
community of the Ahmadiyya as non-muslims and began to promote his 'Islamic Socialism'. This 
new design of Islam alienated not only the US-administration that feared a pro-Communist Pakistan 
but also the religious parties that, with the support of the army, set up a joint opposition, Pakistan 
National Alliance (PNA), against the 'un-islamic' Bhutto regime in 1977. The coup d'état of General 
Zia ul-Haq that followed the same year, was applauded at least by the leaders of JI and JUI, Maw-
lana Mawdudi and Mufti Mahmud. Zia, himself a puristic believer – referred to as 'our fundament-
alist friend in Islamabad' by the CIA staff that cooperated with him during the Afghan Jihad against 
the Soviet Union22 - saw the founding of Pakistan as the fulfillment of a religiously motivated idea 
and therefore made Islam the essence of the state: “Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take 
out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and  
make it a secular state; it would collapse.”23 Some delegates of JI played a crucial role in Zia's cab-
inet, and were actively involved into the planning of Islamization (Nizam-i-Mustafa).24 The suc-
cessor of Mawlana Mawdudi and new amir of JI, Mian Tufail Mohammad who was born in the 
same village and belonged, like Zia, to the tribe of the Ara'in Bara-dari became a willing partner and 
profiteer of the military regime. As the extended arm of Islamabad's regional strategic agenda, the JI 
and a faction of JUI, backed by the military government and the security apparatus, could expand 
their educational infrastructure and set-up a belt of religious schools (dini madaris), seminaries and 
mosques in the north-western tribal area (NWFP) alongside the Afghan border. These institutions 
became effective centers of Sunni religious teaching but dwarfed the infrastructure linked to the 
brelwi movement and the Shia. In the strategic framework of the Afghanistan War, this effective 
Sunni-belt became the recruiting pool for volunteer fighters that soon were involved in what was 
called a jihad for the first time by the Pakistani ‘ulama’ Mawlana 'Abdul Haq and Mawlana Mufti 
Mahmud (JUI).25 
The religious parties of Pakistan were seen more as strategic tools in domestic parliament and 'cam-
22 See Coll, Steve: Ghost Wars. The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion 
to September 10, 2001. New York (a.o.): Penguin, 2004.
23 Cit. Interview Zia ul-Haq. In: The Economist, 12.12.1981, p. 48.
24 For instance Kurshid Ahmad, Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, an influential think tank of JI, former Min-
ister of Planning and Development, served as a Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission from 1978 to 1979.
25 See Gohari, M. J.: The Taliban. Ascent to Power. Karachi: Oxford, 1999, pp. 115-121; Grare, Frédéric: Pakistan and 
the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985. Karachi: Oxford, 2003. 
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pus politics' and the regional agenda, e.g. during the Afghan War and in Kashmere, rather than seri-
ous competitors in the political game. The strategy of governmental support for selected religious 
groups under the era of Zia, that ended in 1988, was continued by subsequent governments. 
2.2 Israel
The Zionist groups that were committed to the idea of a territorial and political Jewish state were 
not only predominantly secular, but they emphasized the demand to radically break with traditional 
Judaism and the period of exile, associated with the stereotype of the 'Ghetto Jew'. Only the estab-
lishment of a state for the Jewish people could guarantee for the protection against repressions and 
antisemitism. 'Leaving the Ghetto' of Europe and settling land was the amalgam that had held the 
various Zionist groups together since not only the question where the Jewish State was to be foun-
ded divided the different camps.26
The Zionists of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) had ever been confronted by the European 
Orthodoxy, that refused the idea of a Jewish nation-state, built by human hands before the interven-
tion of the Messiah – “Our nation is a nation only through its Torah”27. In this respect, the cultural 
Zionism of Achad Ha'am aimed at forming a new Hebrew cultural framework for the immigrants to  
Palestine. Arts, language, academia and literature were the grounds on which a new type of Hebrew 
self-understanding – the Hebrew 'Muscle Jew' - emerged. This clear distinction between secular and 
religious perished, when a minority of rabbis joined the Zionist project and religious Zionism was 
invented. From the orthodox point of view, this form combined the requirements of tradition and of 
the political ideology of creating a state for Jews in Palestine without contradiction.28 In regard to 
the messianic element of traditional Orthodox thought, a new dynamic became acute when during 
the 1920's, the chief rabbi of the Yeshuv (Jewish community in Palestine) Abraham Yitzhak HaCo-
hen Cook (1865-1937) declared the Zionist endeavor and the desired Jewish state a pre-stage on the 
way to redemption and the advent of the Messiah. This messianic conception of the state as “God's 
presence in the world” and other teachings of Rabbi Cook strongly influenced the emergence of re-
ligious Zionist groups and the settler movement after the Six-Days-War (1967). 
Until that war the monopoly on religious issues had been maintained by the Ashkenazi Haredim. 
Twenty years earlier, in the discourse on the political legitimation of the state, the role of Judaism 
26 See for instance Shindler, Colin: What Do Zionists Believe? London: Granta Books, 2007, p. 7. 
27 Cit. Saadia Gaon, in: Dieckhoff, Alain: The Invention of a Nation. Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Is-
rael. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2003, p. 138.
28 See Brenner, Michael: Geschichte des Zionismus. München: C.H. Beck, 2. Ed., 2005, pp. 89-92.
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and its expression had become a practical matter since many Zionist leaders, involved in the negoti-
ations in the light of independence, led by Ben-Gurion, agreed on the point that Judaism needed to 
be formalized but advocated a strict division between state and religion. Others voted for the imple-
mentation of Halacha as the guiding and legitimizing principle of the state. The religious-political 
groups, basically represented by the Ashkenazi Agudat Yisrael, demanded the perpetuation of the 
status quo of the Yeshuv – religious jurisdiction, including matters of personal status (marriage, di-
vorce) would continue to be directed by the Chief Rabbinate under Jewish halachic law.29 In return 
for  political  support,  Ben-Gurion  accepted  further  demands  regarding  Sabbath,  Kashrut laws, 
autonomy of religious education and representation in the High Court.30 
The period from 1977 to 1996 illustrated not only a deeper involvement of religious issues in do-
mestic and foreign policy but also deep struggles within the religious parties vis-à-vis their ideolo-
gical and ethnic setup and religious leadership and the competition between the national-religious 
(religious-Zionist)  and the ultra-orthodox bloc. This competition became obvious when the reli-
gious-political landscape was more and more fragmented by splits and mergers.31 The diversifica-
tion caused by the rise of new competitors in the religious sector is most impressively illustrated by 
the emergence of Shas in 1984: The autonomy of the religious education system, which is run inde-
pendently of the state school system, but with state funds, and veto power on religious legislation 
had always been part of coalition agreements which in return implied a non-involvement in the gov-
ernment's decision on war and peace.32 Especially in the Ashkenazi-dominated Haredi world, the 
newcomers from  Edot HaMitzrach  - the entire orthodox and non-orthodox Oriental Jewish com-
munity from Northern Africa and the Middle East - were soon perceived as a serious threat as they 
claimed the same political  benefits  in return for joining the ruling coalition.33 NRP and it's  ul-
tra-orthodox counterparts Agudat Yisrael (Ashkenazi Chassidic stream), Degal HaTorah (Ashkenazi 
Lithuanian stream)34 and Shas also shared substantial power in various ministries as well as eco-
29 The Judges Act of Knesset was adopted in 1953.
30 See Mittleman, Alan L.: The Politics of Torah. The Jewish Political Tradition and the Founding of Agudat Israel.  
New York: SUNY, 1996.
31 Tami (1981) and Matzad (1984) split from NRP and rejoined in 1988. Traditionally, though mixed in its ranks, NRP 
is more Ashkenazi-oriented. More significant was the split of Shas from Agudat Yisrael in 1984 which was a Seph-
ardic response to the Ashkenazi dominance predominantly for ethnic reasons. Later, in 1992, the two Ashkenazi 
parties, Aguda together with Degel HaTorah, formed United Torah Judaism (UTJ). 
32 See Bradley, C. Paul: Parliamentary Elections in Israel: Three Case Studies. Grantham, N.H.: Tompson & Rutter,  
1985, pp. 20-26.
33 Beside the new political arrangement of the religious bloc, the supremacy of Ashkenazi orthodox scholarship which 
was based on the traditional education system of the Yeshiva, formed in Eastern Europe, had to compromise with an  
emerging Sephardic scholarship. See The Jerusalem Post International Ed.: Rising Star, April 22-28, 1984.
34 Agadat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah represent the traditional Eastern European (Ashkenazi) Haredi society.  Until 
1990, when the two streams united in the Knesset, they were historical rivals, due to different religious clashes  
between their leaders (Rebbe,  Rav). At that time, their spiritual leader from the smaller Lithuanian wing, Rabbi 
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nomic and political institutions. In this context, the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs as 
well as the implementation of Israel's Chief Rabbinate - constituted by an Ashkenazi and a Sephardi 
Rabbi - became main issues in religious politics.35 
From 1996 onwards, a change within the religious parties, and the rise of a new generation of politi-
cians can be identified within the groups' hierarchies. Although Israel has ever been an immigration 
state and “melting pot”, the increased number of Jews from the former Soviet Union arriving in Is-
rael during the 1990's challenged the state's potential in terms of the immigrants' absorption and so-
cioeconomic integration. Avigdor Lieberman, who immigrated from Moldova to Israel in 1978 and 
soon entered political life in the Likud created a political representation of the Russian immigrants 
when he founded Yisrael Beitenu in 1999. In the very same year the party took four seats in the Fif-
teenth Knesset. The electoral success of Yisrael Beitenu- similar to the rise of Shas - demonstrated 
the power of identity and ethnic politics and the loyalty of Israel's marginalized communities. Tradi-
tional constituencies of the National Religious Party and the right-wing list Ichud Leumi, especially 
among the settlers, were attracted by Lieberman's secular nationalist program. Finally, when Lieber-
man became Foreign Minister in the Netanyahu cabinet after the elections in 2009, the overlapping 
of secular  and religious concepts of nationalism in the parties'  agendas became apparent.36 The 
Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000-2005) provoked a political turn in Israel's national security 
and policies and spurred new areas of conflict between elements of the religious right and the Israeli 
state that culminated with the Gaza disengagement in 2005 and tightened a new cleavage in Israel's 
society based on different interpretations of the territorial issue. Earlier, from 1978 to 1982, this cli-
mate of confrontation between a geo-theological reasoning on the one hand versus a logic, based on 
national security as well as diplomatic concerns on the other hand had materialized in the protests 
against the Sinai withdrawal and again, in 2009, affected the decision by the Netanyahu government 
for a freeze of settlements.
The national-religious camp which is on the political level represented by the National Religious 
Party (NRP)- today's New Mafdal party HaBayit HaYehudi- since the 1970's, when the Young Gen-
eration faction gained control of the party, has used its political power and defined a new party 
Eliezer Shach, was seen by both streams as the ultimate rabbinical authority. 
35 See Unna, Separate Ways, 1987, pp. 100-105.
36 The current cabinet is with 30 ministers, among them several ministers without portfolio, the largest in the parlia-
mentary history of Israel. Due to what Asher Arian calls the “chaotic nature” of the Israeli political system, the low 
two-percent qualifying threshold for elections, and therefore a large number of parties and difficulties in forming 
governments made the distribution of cabinet positions important in coalition deals. Among the religious parties,  
only Shas and NRP MKs serve in ministerial positions since the Ashkenazi parties traditionally refuse to get in -
volved in the process of political decision making in the Zionist state. 
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agenda by forcing the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Through education and settlements, 
organizations such as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) and the Movement for the Greater Land 
of Israel, ought to strengthen the Jewish character of the state and have attained many achievements  
in this specific arena.37
Under Zevulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben Meir, religious leaders of Gush Emunim were placed on 
the NRP's list of candidates such as Rabbi Chaim Druckman, one of the leading religious authorities 
in the settlements.38 Druckman represented a generation of orthodox religious scholars who gradu-
ated from the Yeshiva Mercaz HaRav, which is considered to be one of the most influential religious 
institutions in orthodox Judaism. Founded by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) - the father 
of Rabbi Zvi Kook who became the spiritual mentor of Gush Emunim - in 1924 in Jerusalem, the 
Mercaz and the attitude of its graduates shifted away from an integrative and liberal orthodox view 
to a hardliner position in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and the settlement policy which 
they interpreted as a natural and historical right of the “Congregation of Israel”.39 Sharing the coali-
tion with the new elected Likud government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin was for NRP a lo-
gical step. In an electoral-based context, the antagonism of weak electoral results and the party’s so-
cial power become obvious, since NRP decreased in popularity from an initial success in 1977 with 
twelve seats to a power loss in 1984 with only four seats. 40
When the right-wing Likud, including the former Herut party, entered the political game and three 
decades of Labor rule ended, Begin proceeded to implement ideological elements of the Revisionist 
Zionists' framework41 into what Ilan Peleg considers a “neo-Revionist” framework42. The Revision-
ist Movement, an extreme rightist stream within Zionism under the leadership of Vladimir Ze'ev Ja-
botinsky (1880-1940), ought to protect the Jewish communities in Europe from the threat of anti-
37 Athough there are only a few ultra-orthodox settlements in the Westbank, statistics show that the Haredi population 
in this settlements constitutes 26 percent of the total Jewish settler population (289.600, July 2009)  in the Westbank.  
The Haredi communities in this area are therefore the seconded largest compared to the settlements of national-reli -
gious (25 percent), secular (16 percent) and mixed communities (33 percent). See ICG Middle East Report: Israel's  
Religious Right and the Question of Settlements. No. 89, 2009, pp. 12-16 and Appendix B, Map of religious com-
position of settlements, p. 40.
38 See Bradley, 1985, pp. 54-57. 
39 For the ideology of Rabbi Zvi Cook and Messianism, see Ravitzky, Aviezer: Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Reli-
gious Radicalism. Chicago (a.o.): The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 80-96.
40 In 1981, NRP gained six Knesset seats. See Arian, Asher: Politics in Israel. The Second Republic. 2nd Ed. Washing-
ton D.C.: CQ Books, 2005, p. 93.
41 See Peleg, Ilan: Begin`s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983. Israel`s Move to the Right. New York (a.o.): Greenwood Press, 
1987, pp. 1-15; Peleg, Ilan: A Constructivist Interpretation of Likud's Foreign Policy, 1977-1999: The Production of  
Insecurity.  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International  Studies Association. Montreal, March 17, 
2004, pp. 11-13. 
42 See Peleg, 1987, pp. 51-93.
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semitism and was influenced by European nationalism and elements of fascism. As one of Jabotin-
sky's students and admirers Menachem Begin internalized the paradigm of “building a wall of iron” 
around the Israeli state.43 This included the vision of Eretz Yisrael as the expanded Land of Israel 
dedicated to the Jewish people by God. Politically, the Greater Israel ideology was transformed into 
an ultra-nationalist agenda and became the core of right-wing foreign politics and a strong compon-
ent of Israel's military-security setup. Although Likud never had a similar organizational strength 
possessed by Labor parties and leftist groups, Labor lacked to oppose the strong territorial compon-
ent of the rightist ideology. The expansion and protection of the land and the call for “tenable bor-
ders” became predominant in the elections of 1977: The success of the Arab armies during the first 
days of Yom Kippur War (6.10.-24.10.1973) created a powerful trauma in the nation's psyche and 
memory. Large parts of the Israeli public were attracted by the hawkish neo-Revisionist attitude. 
During his tenures, Begin offered more than just symbolic gestures towards the national-religious 
right and the ultra-orthodox leadership. Soon, after his election victory he met with Rabbi Zvi Ye-
huda  HaCohen  Kook,  the  spiritual  father  of  Gush  Emunim44,  and  Rabbi  Menachem  Mendel 
Schneerson, the highest authority of Chabad-Chassidism.45 
Facing an evident movement of the political system rightward and an ideological radicalization of 
the Israeli society, the religious-nationalist position of NRP's hardliners towards the settlements be-
came more acceptable for the new political mainstream. Vice versa, the support of the new cabinet 
for the establishment of new settlements in the Westbank, announced by Begin and the new agricul-
ture minister Ariel Sharon immediately after the elections, was highly appreciated by the settlers of 
Gush Emunim.46 Although, a semi-official support for Israeli settlers existed in a similar manner un-
der the rule of Labor before Likud came into power, the national-religious activists' rhetoric against 
43 The commitment of Likud leaders to the Revisionist thought and to “one of the intellectual giants in the annals of 
Zionism” becomes obvious in a number of parliamentary rituals. Cit. Address by PM Benjamin Netanyahu to Knes -
set Session in Memory of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, July 22, 2009, released by Knesset Publ. Division. 
44 According to the memoirs of a student of Kook's Mercaz HaRav who attended the reception, “he [Begin] came as if  
to Canossa, as if this man, Tvi Yehuda, was God's representative. Suddenly the Prime Minister kneels and bows be-
fore Tvi Yehuda. Imagine for yourself what all the students standing there and watching this surrealistic scene where  
thinking.” Cit. in Lustick, 1988, p. 37.
45 Rabbi Schneerson (1902-1996) - referred to by his followers as the “Lubavitcher Rebbe” - although moderate in  
many aspects of Halachic interpretations, said that evacuation of Jewish land is illegal according to Halachic law. 
46 See Peleg, Ilan: Begin`s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983. Israel`s Move to the Right. New York (a.o.): Greenwood Press, 
1987, pp. 45-47. For the Likud revolution (Mahapakh) and the transformation of Israeli society, see Eisenstadt, S. 
N.: Explorations in Jewish Historical Experience. The Civilizational Dimension. Leiden (a.o.): Brill, 2004, pp. 139-
204. After the Likud's second election victory in 1981, government and ministries accelerated and expanded their  
support for the Westbank settlements. This included programs of land acquisition, and from 1977 to mid-1981 a  
400-million US-Dollar investment and between 1981 and 1984 another 600 Million US-Dollar program for infra-
structural development. See Lustick, Ian S.: For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988, pp. 40, 46/47. The benevolent policy of land distribution - which is in the 
Westbank predominantly administrated by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) - to Jewish Israeli settlers is still a very  
ambivalent one. 
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the demanded withdrawal from the Sinai territory - “not an inch!” - provided a shared oppositional 
position for religious and secular nationalists to the plan and even polarized the political left.47 Par-
allel to the Sinai withdrawal that followed the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979, Gush Emunim,  
after it came into existence in February 1974, concentrated its settlement activities in the Westbank. 
It changed from a “silent consent”, in its method hidden and with no media coverage - according to 
Defense Minister Shimon Peres, the IDF did neither help them- nor hinder them - into an official re-
cognition by the new right-wing government of 1977.48 
The first settlements in the Yesha region were initiated by Gush Emunim activists. Though the or-
ganization formally vanished, Eretz  Yisrael  remained the main ideological  pillar  of the settlers' 
worldview and the successor organization Yesha Council. The Council is the local administrative 
body of the Westbank settlements and coordinates municipal as well as security issues. It provides a 
political channel through which the settlers' interests are communicated to the Knesset. The com-
mitment to the state's Zionism, especially to its army is documented by the high number of recruits 
from the Westbank settlements, who join – after having completed the three-years of compulsory 
service – the elite units of the IDF and officer candidate courses.49 
The religious Zionist “movement of concrete redemption in our time” highlights an active Jewish 
engagement in the process of redemption (Yesha) of the people and the land of Israel: 
The Messiah […] is not responsible for the plant and the growth of the fruit, but rather for its  
ripening.  The  concrete,  historical  Beginning  we  are  witnessing  today hast  not  come  about 
through a personal redeemer, but through our collective activity and the changes that have taken 
place in our character as a people.50
This imperative of action is linked to the belief in a post-Zionist messianic age.51 This sort of three-
way connection between God, the People of Israel and the Torah is not exclusively religious-Zionist 
since it is a basic belief, shared by the Haredi interpretation and many secular Israelis and even anti-
47 See Cohen, Asher: Political Partners: Relations between Religious and Non-Religious in One Political Party, pp.  
132/133. In: Liebman, Charles S. (Ed.): Religious and Secular. Conflict and Accommodation between Jews in Israel. 
Jerusalem: Keter Publ., 1990, pp. 131-150.
48 In 1975, Peres recognized Ofra, the first settlement of Gush Emunim, as “a worker's camp for purposes of regional  
defense”. See Shalev, Nir: The Ofra Settlement. An Unauthorized Outpost. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2008, p. 7/8.
49 Serving in these units, especially in the higher ranks of the legendary Golani and Paratrooper Brigades, was during 
the period of the socialist pioneer spirit which marked the 1950's and 1960's strictly limited to the Kibbutzim youth. 
From the 1970's to the present more and more graduates from the settlements serve in the units and reflect a social  
as well as ideological change. Interview Gideon Spiro, Founder Yesh Gvul, Tel Aviv 11.01.2010; and Arian, 2005, 
pp. 88/89. 
50 Cit. Ravitzky, Aviezer: Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. Chicago (a.o.): The Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1996, p. 81.
51 Ibid., p. 79.
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Zionists.52 In contrast to this, the idea of messianic redemption - which finds its strongest expression 
in the ideology of religious Zionism - will become more evident when considering the meaning of 
the Israeli state in the light of the anti-Zionists:
Seeing the coming of Zionism and the founding of the state of Israel as an opportunity for Jews  
to improve their situation, but not as the beginning of redemption. […] [They] will avoid any 
contact with the state, since they see it not only as illegitimate, but as an act of blasphemy. For 
them the state is still a place of exile, until the coming of the Messiah.53
Unlike the interpretation of the state as “the beginning of redemption”, the idea of the Land implies 
an attribution of religious dimensions to a concrete geography within a cultural process of “map-
ping”. Kippenberg and von Stuckrad state that in this geo-theology, a grading according to the holi-
ness and religious purity of a geographic place is central for the interpretation of Eretz Yisrael as the 
holy land with Jerusalem and the “lost Temple” in its center. In the Temple's holiest circle the mani-
festation of God (Schechinah) is still present and also manifested in the Hebrew Bible, the Torah. 
According to the messianic belief, which was promoted by Rabbi Zvi Kook, historical events such 
as the Balfour-Declaration (1917), the existence of the Israeli state, the Six Days War (June 1967) 
and the conquest and settlement of the country are steps within the process of redemption which 
will lead the Jewish People into a Messianic Age in which a third temple will be constructed.54
3. Religious-political Parties
Looking at the political history of Pakistan and Israel, religious organizations and activists are in-
volved not only in issues restricted to purely religious disputes, but they have testified their ability 
to mobilize particular sectors of society on religious, ethnic and political grounds. Especially the 
ethnic factor in combination with a religious agenda, brought by a new dynamic in the political sys-
tems of Pakistan and Israel. Given an exclusive setup of both political communities and their insti-
tutions  that  was  maintained  in  essence  the  political  dominance  by one  ethno-national  group  – 
Ashkenazi Jews linked to secular Zionism in Israel and in Pakistan old Punjubi families more liber-
al in their Islamic tradition and stemming from the urban salariat class and the military – was chal -
lenged by the engagement of new competitors on the political scene. Exemplary is in the Israeli 
case the rise of the Sephardi Guardians of the Torah (Shas) during the 1980's as the reaction of the 
Sephardi minority to a social, economic and scholarly marginalization in the Israeli State. However, 
52 Interview Rabbi Shmuel Strauss, Educational Director Institute for Science and Halacha, 22.12.2009.
53 Cit. Beit-Hallahmi, 1992, p. 133.
54 The Second Temple was destroyed in 70CE during the Roman-Jewish War. See Kippenberg, Hans G./ von Stuckrad, 
Kocku: Einführung in die Religionswissenschaft.  Gegenstände und Begriffe. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003, pp. 114-
120. 
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it was a generation of young rabbis, stemming predominantly from a Middle Eastern Sephardi mi-
lieu whose split from the Askenazi mother party Agudat Yisrael was basically induced by scholarly 
arguments and sectarian disputes. Their claim of restoring the 'Sephardi crown to its ancient glory' 
ought primarily to restore the prestige of the Sephardi seminaries and Torah schools (yeshivot), 
rather than to create a political platform to represent a 'Sephardi identity' – a term that had in fact 
never been used in Israel before Shas entered the political community. In Pakistan, the political or-
ganizations of the Deobandi, Jam‘iyyat-e ‘Ulama’-e Islam, together with the Jama'at-i Islami, the 
self-proclaimed 'Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution' and three other religious parties of the Shia, 
the Brelwis, the Ahl-e-Hadith formed the political alliance Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA). The 
results of the 2002 national and provincial elections of about 18 percent for the MMA that took over 
the government in the North-Wester Frontier Province and participated in the Balochistan govern-
ment was based on an intensive mobilization of ethnic identities in the border area, namely the 
Pakhtuns. The Pakhtuns were from the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2001) 
involved in the war against the US Army in Afghanistan, therefore, anti-American resentments are 
still  strong and were systematically activated by the religious-parties.  The religious card of the 
game - 'Islam in danger' - to the present is frequently activated. 
Generally, religious parties fulfill those legal conditions that apply to secular political parties and 
are in terms of analysis structurally not distinct from political parties.55 Therefore, they participate 
in the civic culture and have to accommodate their program with the principles of legitimacy – es-
pecially the religious component of a state's ideology - to which they frequently refer. For instance, 
due to the paradigm of the State of Israel as a Jewish state on the basis of the Jewish cultural and re-
ligious heritage no secular political party would distance itself from the religious symbolism which 
is materialized in various official ceremonies and rituals in the Israeli political arena. In the same 
way,  with  the  exception  of  the Ashkenazi  ultra-orthodox party Agudat  Yisrael  (today's  alliance 
United Torah Judaism) no party that identifies itself at least to a certain extent with religion, would 
not label itself as “Super-Zionist”56 and as loyal to state and nation. The case of Agudat Yisrael is 
exceptional since the party and its Council of Torah Sages refuses the Zionist State of Israel but  
holds  seats in the Knesset. Some functionaries lead ministries, but under the title of a 'Deputy Min-
ister' (MK Yaakov Litzman, former chairman of the Finance Committee of Knesset),  which ex-
presses  the maximum of commitment  to  the Zionist  state,  the  haredim are  willing to  show. In 
Pakistan,  the  same phenomenon can  be  observed when ethnic-nationalist  parties  that  distanced 
55 See Rosenblum, Nancy L.: Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Demo -
cratic Thought,. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2003, pp. 23-53.
56 Interview Rabbi Nissim Ze'ev, Founder Shas, Jerusalem, 04.01.2010. 
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themselves in the past from Islamic phrases, increasingly refer to Islamic values and traditions and 
share  their  expressions  in  public  life,  e.g.  when  leaders  of  the  Muttahida  Quami  Movement 
(MQM)57, a party that promoted to rights of the Indian Muslim immigrants to Pakistan (muhajirun) 
after Partition in 1947, join the Shia processions at the occasion of Muharram. 
The religious repertoire is activated not only by parties that are traditionally supposed to be reli-
gious and originate from a religious school of thought with a specific ideology. Rather, secular 
parties accumulate religious elements within the field of political competition as a source of legitim-
acy in a civic culture that is strongly influenced by religious values. It is, as Marty puts it, the “reli-
gio-secular” world of our times that is “neither exclusively secular not exclusively religious, but 
rather a complex combination of both the religious and the secular, with religious and secular phe-
nomenon occurring at the same time in individuals, in groups, and in societies”58. In return, reli-
gious political groups accumulate secular elements while promoting a doctrinaire religious agenda. 
This is due to the secular electoral 'rules of the game' and necessary to open the ranks of a party 
platform for members and supporters of other religious, political and social milieus and to mobilize 
them as voters in order to maximize their chances of entering governing coalitions.59 
As Demerath and Williams emphasized, the secular ruling elite uses religion to pursue power but 
tries to distance itself from religion as soon as the power structures have been consolidated.60 This 
policy of  keeping religion at arm's length is illustrated by various cases in Pakistan and Israel the  
political leadership frequently gains the support of religious leaders. Though we could state that 
these gestures are more symbolic, the traditional religious sector has learned to capitalize this de-
pendence and claims in return pragmatic political concessions. For instance, following a rabbi and 
asking for his spiritual support is not exceptional in Israeli politics. Private audiences at the resid-
ences of former Israeli Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yussuf, the spiritual master (maran) of Shas, are an in-
herent part of Israeli political culture. In the case of Kadima leader Tzipi Livni this ritual became a 
57 Formerly Muhajir Quami Movement. According to some analysts, MQM dropped the ethnic Muhajir marker to  
strengthen its claim of national competitiveness and to open its ideological also for the wider religious symbolism. 
See Budhani, Azmat Ali [a.o.]: The Open City: Social Networks and Violence in Karachi. In: Crises States Working 
Papers, No. 2, 2010, pp. 4-7.  
58 Cit. Marty, Martin E.: Our Religio-Secular World, p. 42. In: Daedalus, 132, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 42-48.
59 In addition, many parties that can be located somewhere in between secular and religious ideological positions,  
found organizations that later become semi-autonomous units, e.g. Jama'at-e Islami and its student wing IJT, Gush 
Emunim and NRP. In addition to this, they 'integrate political activity with social and spiritual life. Seen as part of  
this web of associations with overlapping affiliations, religious parties appear more like membership groups than 
other parties', cit. Rosenblum, Nancy L.: Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of 
Liberal Democratic Thought, p. 33. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2003, pp. 23-53.
60 See Demerath, N. J./ Williams, Rhys, H.: A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New England City. Prin -
ceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
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very challenging issue when Rabbi Ovadia refused to  receive the female Kadima leader in the 
middle of the 2009 polls election campaign, when Livni refused to accept the demands of Shas to 
re-extend the financial support for the religious education system and the subsidiaries for families 
that was before drastically reduced by than Minister of Finance Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud). In 
Pakistan, Islamic missionary movements such as Tanzeem ul-Ikhwan and Tablighi Jama'at and high 
position representatives of the military and civic bureaucracy have cultivated frequent circles for 
prayers (zikr). These gatherings were initiated by General Zia but have become strong networks 
were the religious leaders meet local politicians, generals, former Chiefs of the Army Staff and 
former Directors of ISI - or in the words of the former leader of JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmad: “These  
generals decided against the colonial legacy of the Britishers and the military rulers but for the Is-
lamic tradition of Pakistan.”61  
Generalizing, the instrumentalization of religious parties by the state aims at 1) marginalizing com-
peting mainstream parties, 2) appeasing the religious sector by power sharing in the government or 
limited legal, political or institutional concessions, 3) gaining social and financial control over the 
institutions of the traditional religious sector (see Jamal Malik's 'Colonialization of Islam'62), 4) le-
gitimizing rule by religious means and symbols and 5) integrating religious groups as a proxy force 
in the regional geo-strategic agenda ('state sponsorship'63).
Conclusion
Scholars of many disciplines and the increasing number of studies in the field of religion and polit-
ics tend to focus on 1) the reasons behind the dominant role of religion in societies in the light of the 
secularization paradigm and 2) the impact of the bearer of religion, religious parties on domestic 
and international  politics.  Implicit  to this  is  often a  trend to  contrast  the Western-styled liberal 
democratic thought with the emergence of religious-political parties and non-parliamentary partisan 
movements not least to a religious-based threat to democracy. However, in the case of this study, 
one has to take into account that religious groups in Pakistan and Israel from the beginning were 
actively involved in the negotiations with the political leadership on the religious character of the 
future state.  While both states have consciously avoided a theocratic model of statehood, in both 
countries the initially reluctant religious sector has successfully gained disproportionate political 
and discourse power. Considering the concept of 'religious nationalism' by Mark Juergensmeyer and 
61 Interview Qazi Hussain Ahmad, former amir Jama'at-i-Islami, Lahore, 21.08.2009.
62 Malik, Jamal S.: Colonialization of Islam. Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, 
1996.
63 See for instance Byman, Daniel: Deadly Connections. States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005.  
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Peter van der Veer64, religious actors have to be seen not only as players in the political arena but 
also as shaping powers and important agents of nation building. In contrast to this, e.g. in most 
countries of the Muslim world, where religious groups gained power, they were systematically ex-
cluded from the political process. As nations in the making, Pakistan and Israel had to create identit-
ies, impose languages, and contend with artificial boundaries. Although Israel and Pakistan came 
into existence to serve as a homeland for all Jews and all Indian Muslims, this raison d'être is chal-
lenged by the fact that more Jews and Indian Muslims live outside the national territory than inside,  
suggesting that these national enterprises are far from complete. 
64 Juergensmeyer, Mark: The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular Order. Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Press, 2003, van der Veer, Peter: Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: Univ. of  
California Press, 1994.
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